000			04375cam a2200433Ki 4500
001			12686
003			MaCbMITP
005			20210629145709.0
006			m o d
007			cr cnu---unuuu
008			200821s2020 maua ob 001 0 eng d
040			_aOCoLC-P _beng _erda _epn _cOCoLC-P
020			_a0262358638 _q(electronic book)
020			_a9780262358637 _q(electronic book)
020			_z9780262044042 _q(hardcover)
020			_z0262044048 _q(hardcover)
035			_a(OCoLC)1187209134
035			_a(OCoLC-P)1187209134
050		4	_bG56 2020eb
082	0	4	_a338.82 _223
100	1		_aGilbert, Richard J., _d1945- _9106720
245	1	0	_aInnovation matters : _bcompetition policy for the high-technology economy / _cRichard J. Gilbert.
264		1	_aCambridge, Massachusetts : _bThe MIT Press, _c[2020]
300			_a1 online resource (viii, 324 pages) : _billustrations (black and white).
336			_btxt
337			_bc
338			_bcr
500			_aIT Carlow ebook
520			_a"Antitrust enforcement has long been focused on price competition-approving or denying mergers based on whether or not it would create or reduce opportunities for consumers to be able to "shop around" for the lowest prices when it comes to internet access, cable subscriptions, airfare, and so on. It is relatively easy to evaluate price impacts-these are qualitative measures and economic theory presents many tools to be able to do so. However, the impact of antitrust policy on innovation is much less well known, and harder to study. Was Microsoft abusing a monopoly by bundling a web browser with its operating system? Would a merger of Genzyme and Novazyme, the only companies with active research and development programs for Pompe Disease promote or delay a cure for this fatal genetic disorder? Is Google's search engine good for consumers or not? This book collects the current state of knowledge about the relationships between market structure, firm behavior, and the production of new products and services, all to provide a clear picture of the challenges of making and enforcing antitrust policy in the digital era. Gilbert addresses the ways in which legal precedents established in the twentieth century no longer hold up in the twenty-first, complicates existing theories by Schumpeter and Arrow about competition, and attempts to make meaning out of the conflicting empirical literature surrounding mergers. Gilbert does not shy away from making recommendations. A few examples: In cases where one firm acquires a competitor, he calls for antitrust enforcement officials and courts to pay more attention to whether acquired firms are successful innovators. In some cases, an incumbent acquiring a new entrant does stymy innovation as there are then fewer firms operating in the same space, but in other cases, people launch start-ups with the hopes of getting bought out by a competitor, and so prohibiting acquisition of a competing firm could limit the number of innovative new companies that are launched. He also discusses the role of interoperability standards in promoting innovation on the one hand, through the economies of scale allowable by knowing that components developed can be used across a number of devices, but also its role in limiting innovation when dominant firms coalesce around a standard that is unreachable by competitors. Gilbert's main argument is that existing antitrust law is flexible enough to be relevant in the digital era, but courts must stop focusing almost exclusively on questions of price and consider a broader range of questions regarding competition and innovation"-- _cProvided by publisher.
588			_aOCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.
650		0	_aHigh technology industries. _9106721
650		0	_aCompetition. _9106722
650		0	_aAntitrust law _xEconomic aspects. _9106723
650		0	_aConsolidation and merger of corporations _xLaw and legislation _xEconomic aspects. _9106724
653			_aECONOMICS/Industrial Organization
653			_aBUSINESS/Innovation
856	4	0	_yLink to MIT Press online resource _uhttps://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/12686.001.0001?locatt=mode:legacy
856	4	2	_3OCLC metadata license agreement _uhttp://www.oclc.org/content/dam/oclc/forms/terms/vbrl-201703.pdf
999			_c50772 _d50772